CASE DIGEST NO. 3

CASE DIGEST NO. 3
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
GUEVARA VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS (104 SCRA 268)
FACTS:

The facts which gave rise to the present contemptuous incident are: The Commission on Elections, on May 4, 1957, after proper negotiations, awarded to the National Shipyards & Steel Corporation (NASSCO), the Acme Steel Mfg. Co., Inc. (ACME), and the Asiatic Steel Mfg. Co., Inc. (ASIATIC), the contracts to manufacture and supply the Commission 12,000, 11,000 and 11,000 ballot boxes at P17.64, P14.00 and P17.00 each, respectively. On May 8, 1957, both the NASSCO and the ASIATIC signed with the Commission on Elections the corresponding contracts thereon. On May 13, 1957, the Commission cancelled the award to the ACME for failure of the latter to sign the contract within the designated time and awarded to the NASSCO and the ASIATIC, one-half each, the 11,000 ballot boxes originally alloted to the ACME. The corresponding contracts thereon were signed on May 16, 1957.

Then followed a series of petitions filed by the ACME for the reconsideration of the resolution of the Commission of May 13, 1957. The first of these petitions was filed on May 14, 1957 which, after hearing, was denied by the Commission in its resolution of May 16, 1957. The second petition was filed on May 16, 1957 and was denied on May 17, 1957. The third petition was filed on May 20, 1957, and because of the seriousness of the grounds alleged therein for the annulment of its previous resolutions, the Commission resolved to conduct a formal investigation on the matter ordering the NASSCO and the ASIATIC to file their respective answers. Thereafter, after these corporations had filed their answers, the Commission held a formal hearing thereon on May 24, 1957. On May 28, 1957, the ACME filed a memorandum on the points adduced during the hearing, and on June 4, 1957, the Commission issued its resolution denying the third motion for reconsideration. The article signed by petitioner was published in the June 2, 1957 issue of the Sunday Times, a newspaper of nationwide circulation.

ISSUE:

The question to be determined is whether the Commission on Elections has the power and jurisdiction to conduct contempt proceedings against petitioner with a view to imposing upon him the necessary disciplinary penalty in connection with the publication of an article in the Sunday Times issue of June 2, 1957 which, according to the charge, tended to interfere with and influence said Commission in the adjudication of a controversy then pending determination and to degrade and undermine the function of the Commission and its members in the administration of all laws relative to the conduct of elections.

HELD:

It would therefore appear that the Commission on Elections not only has the duty to enforce and administer all laws relative to the conduct of elections but the power to try, hear and decide any controversy that may be submitted to it in connection with the elections. And as an incident of this power, it may also punish for contempt in those cases provided for in Rule 64 of the Rules of Court under the same procedure and with the same penalties provided therein. In this sense, the Commission, although it cannot be classified as a court of justice within the meaning of the Constitution (Section 13, Article VIII), for it is merely an independent administrative body (The Nacionalista Party vs. Vera, 85 Phil., 126; 47 Off. Gaz. 2375), may however exercise quasi-judicial functions in so far as controversies that by express provision of the law come under its jurisdiction. As to what questions may come within this category, neither the Constitution nor the Revised Election Code specifies. The former merely provides that it shall come under its jurisdiction, saving those involving the right to vote, all administrative questions affecting elections, including the determination of the number and location of polling places, and the appointment of election inspectors and other election officials, while the latter is silent as to what questions may be brought before it for determination. But it is clear that, to come under its jurisdiction, the questions should be controversial in nature and must refer to the enforcement and administration of all laws relative to the conduct of election. The difficulty lies in drawing the demarcation line between a duty which inherently is administrative in character and a function which is justiciable and which would therefore call for judicial action by the Commission. But this much depends upon the factors that may intervene when a controversy should arise.

RULING OF COURT:

Wherefore, petition is granted. Respondent Commission is hereby enjoined from proceeding with the contempt case set forth in its resolution of June 20, 1957, without pronouncement as to costs.

The preliminary injunction issued by this Court is made permanent.

CASE DIGEST NO. 2

CASE DIGEST NO. 2

COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

SANCHEZ VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS(114 SCRA 454)

FACTS:

The Resolution of the Commission on Elections, dated May 15, 1980, in Pre-Proclamation Case No. 41 entitled Virgilio Sanchez vs. Mayor Armando P. Biliwang and the Municipal Board of Canvassers of San Fernando, Pampanga.

In the local elections held on January 30, 1980, Virgilio Sanchez was the official candidate of the Nacionalista Party (NP) for Municipal Mayor of San Fernando, Pampanga, while Armando Biliwang was the Kilusang Bagong Lipunan,s (KBL) official candidate for the same position.

On February 1, 1980, Sanchez filed with the Commission on Elections a Petition to declare null and void the local elections in San Fernando, Pampanga due to alleged large scale terrorism. On the same day, the COMELEC denied the Petition for lack of merit. Sanchez moved for reconsideration. On February 8, 1980, the COMELEC recalled its Resolution and required Biliwang and the Municipal Board of Canvassers to answer. Hearings were conducted thereafter.

On November 19, 1980, Sanchez filed a petition for Certiorari with this court, docketed as G.R. No. 55513, wherein he seeks a modification of the portion of the COMELEC Resolution of May 15, 1980 refusing to call a special election.

On December 6, 1980, Biliwang instituted, also with this Court, a Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus, docketed as G.R. No. 55642, assailing the same COMELEC Resolution and alleging that same body has no power to annul an entire municipal election.

These two Petitions were ordered consolidated and were heard by the court en banc on July 28, 1981.

ISSUES:

Does the COMELEC have the power to annul an entire municipal election on the ground of post-election terrorism?

Does the COMELEC have the authority to call for a special election?

HELD:

Biliwang Asserts that COMELEC lacks the power to annul elections of municipal officials particularly so because, under Section 190 of the 1978 Election Code, the power to try election contests relative to elective municipal officials is vested in Courts of First Instance.

Be that as it may, it should be recalled that what COMELEC actually rejected were the sham and illegal returns in San Fernando, and that kind of fraud and terrorism perpetrated thereat was sufficient cause for voiding the election as a whole. Besides, COMELEC is empowered motu proprio to suspend and annul any proclamation as, in fact, it did annul Biliwang’s proclamation.

It may be true that there is no specific provision vesting the COMELEC with authority to annul an election. However, there is no doubt either relative to COMELEC’s extensive powers. Under the Constitution, the COMELEC is tasked with the function to “enforce and administer all laws relative to the conduct of elections.” The 1978 Election Code accords it exclusive charge of the enforcement and administration of all laws relative to the conduct of elections for the purpose of insuring free, orderly and honest elections.

In other words, in line with the plenitude of its powers and its function to protect the integrity of elections, the COMELEC must be deemed possessed of authority to annul elections where the will of the voters has been defeated and the purity of elections sullied. It would be unreasonable to state that the COMELEC has a legal duty to perform and at the same time deny it the wherewithal to fulfill that task.

On this issue, the COMELEC opined that it had no power to order the holding of new or special election.

Thus, the COMELEC deemed it imperative “to certify to the President/Prime Minister and the Batasang Pambansa the failure of election in San Fernando, Pampanga, so that remedial legislation may be enacted.

Again, the foregoing Opinions were rendered under the regime of the 1935 Constitution and the former Revised Election Code, whereby there was no constitutional nor statutory precept that empowered the COMELEC to direct a new election after one had already been held. Under Section 8 of that former statute, authority was given to the President to postpone the election upon the recommendation of the COMELEC. And Section 21 (c) of the same law authorized the President to issue a proclamation calling a special election whenever the election for a local office failed to take place on the date fixed by law. In other words, the prerogative to postpone an election or call a special election, was formerly lodged with the President.

As the laws now stand, however, COMELEC has been explicitly vested with the authority to “call for the holding or continuation of the election.”

Clearly, under Section 5 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 52, when the election “results in a failure to elect, the COMELEC may call for the “holding or continuation of the election as soon as practicable.” We construe this to include the calling of a special election in the event of a failure to elect in order to make the COMELEC truly effective in the discharge of its functions. In fact, Section 8 of the 1978 Election Code, supra, specifically allows the COMELEC to call a special election for the purpose of fillinf the vacancy or a newly created position, as the case may be. There should be no reason, therefore, for not allowing it to call a special election when there is a failure to elect.

RULING OF COURT:

WHEREFORE. 1) in G.R. No. 55513, the challenged Resolution of May 15, 1980 is hereby modified, and the Commission on Elections hereby held empowered to call a special election where there has been a failure to elect. That portion which certifies the failure of election in San Fernando, Pampanga, to the President and the Batasang Pambansa for the enactment of remedial measures, is hereby set aside.

2) In G.R. No. 55642, the Petition is hereby denied for lack of merit, and the authority of the Commission on Elections to annul an election hereby upheld.

CASE DIGEST NO. 1

CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION

CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION VS. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

FACTS:
Petitioners: Ignacio P. Lacsina, Luis R. Mauricio, Antonio R. Quintos and Juan T. David for petitioners in 83896 and Juan T. David for petitioners in 83815. Both petitions were consolidated and are being resolved jointly as both seek a declaration of unconstitutionality of Executive Order No. 284 issued by President Corazon C. Aquino.

Executive Order No. 284, according to the petitioners allows members of the cabint, their undersecretaries and assisstant secretaries to hold other than government offices or positions in addition to their primary positions. The pertinent provisions of EO 284 is as follows:

Section 1: A cabinet member, undersecretary or assistant secretary or other appointive officials of the executive department may in addition to his primary position, hold not more than two positions in the government and government corporations and receive corresponding compensation thereof.

Section 2: If they hold more than what is required in section 1, they must relinquish the excess position in favor of the subordinate official who is next in rank, but in no case shall any officer hold not more than two positions other than his primary position.

Section 3: At least 1/3 of the members of the bords of such corporation should either be a secretary, undersecretary or assistant secretary.

The petitioners are challenging EO 284's constitutionality because it adds exceptions to Section 13 of Article VII of the constitution.According to the petitioners, the only exceptions against holding any other office or empolyment in government are those provided in the constitution namely: 1. The Vice President may be appointed as the Cabinet Member under Sec. 3 (2) of Article VII. 2. The secretary of justice is an ex-officio of the Judicial and Bar Council by virtue of Sec. 8 of Article VIII.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Executive Order No. 284 is constitutional.

RULING OF COURT:

No. It is unconstitutional. Petition granted. Executive Order No. 284 was declared null and void.